




Director of  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily (Cable)

16 March 1979

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SITUATION REPORT

CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR

*Vietnam yesterday accused China of adjusting the border between the two countries and called officially for negotiations to begin one week after the "complete withdrawal" of Chinese troops beyond the "historical borderline." The boundary disagreement, which the Chinese want on the agenda, could be a stumbling block to the negotiations. In a note to Beijing, the Vietnamese also suggested that the talks be held in Hanoi or along the border.*

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//Both Chinese and Vietnamese forces probably suffered heavy losses. Chinese casualties were heaviest during the first few days of the war, when their forces were spread thinly across a wide front.

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[REDACTED]

The Soviets are using the Chinese invasion of Vietnam to delay talks on a 1979 trade agreement with China, originally expected to begin in Moscow early this month. A Foreign Ministry official in Moscow has indicated that while the trade of "normal commodities" will continue, the Soviets will not deliver certain goods already ordered by Beijing. Some other contacts between the USSR and China continue, however. Civil aviation talks in Moscow and the regular session of the border river navigation talks in Blagoveshchensk have been held without a hitch.

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

IRAN: Military Revitalization Issue

*There are major disagreements within the new government and all Iranian political factions over the future disposition of the now almost moribund military. The outlook is for no early revitalization of the armed forces--particularly the Army--continued unstable security conditions, and a threat to the government from leftist militias.* [REDACTED]

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The main dispute is between moderate politicians, pro-Khomeini military personnel, and some Islamic paramilitary forces on one side and Charik and Mujahadi radicals on the other. The moderates, led by Deputy Prime Minister Yazdi, believe that the armed forces must be revitalized to preserve the revolution as well as to protect the new regime from external threats and contain regional dissidents. [REDACTED]

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Yazdi has failed so far, however, to convince all Army personnel to return to their units. The soldiers fear retaliation by the heavily armed revolutionaries. Even if the soldiers returned, the problem of leadership would remain. The continuing purge of military officers has resulted in the execution of many generals, the retirement of others, and arrests down to the rank of major. [REDACTED]

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There are few competent substitutes for the purged officers, and many enlisted men, urged on by leftists within the ranks, are insisting on electing their own officers. Yazdi is attempting to combine Mujahadin loyal to Khomeini with some still functioning military units to form the Revolutionary Guard Corps. He apparently hopes that the Corps will attract religious revolutionaries who can at least temporarily fill the leadership vacuum, perhaps even by election to officer positions. [REDACTED]

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Yazdi's plan is being doggedly opposed by Chariks and Mujahadin radicals who are active in revolutionary

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committees within the military. These radicals essentially see the Revolutionary Guard as the core of a future "People's Army." [REDACTED]

Both the Chariks and some Mujahadin will continue to attempt to block revitalization of the armed forces because the military might pose a danger to them in the future. The Chariks, in particular, are aware that Khomeini envisages no political role for Marxists or non-Islamic leftists in an Islamic republic. They will retain their weapons and organization and thus continue to pose a threat to the government. [REDACTED]

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AFGHANISTAN: Urban Fighting

*Fighting broke out yesterday in Herat, the major city in northwestern Afghanistan. Details are sketchy, but [redacted] civilians opposing the government clashed with troops, and government buildings have been burned. [redacted]*

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Central government authority is nonexistent in some tribal areas in the east, and dissidence has been growing elsewhere, but this is the first serious outbreak in a major city. It is unclear whether the violence is related to the call on Monday by exiles in Pakistan for a "holy war" against President Taraki's Marxist government.


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Ultimately, the Soviet-backed regime depends on the loyalty of troops in Kabul. The fighting in Herat, however, may be taken as a sign of growing government weakness and encourage Taraki's opponents throughout the country. The spread of open opposition to the cities, moreover, increases the strain on the loyalty of the military, already unhappy over having to fight the tribes.

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TURKEY: Demise of CENTO

Turkey's decision, announced yesterday, to withdraw from the Central Treaty Organization effectively terminates the alliance. The Turkish action was triggered by Pakistan's announcement on Monday of its withdrawal from CENTO, which followed Iran's reaffirmation of its decision earlier this year to leave. The end of CENTO does not affect the security of Turkey, which has relied on NATO as its principal defense alliance. CENTO served Turkey primarily by providing close political ties to Iran and Pakistan. [REDACTED]

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#### ROMANIA: Consumer Price Increases

The Romanian Government has raised retail prices an average of 28 percent for several types of household appliances, clothing, and construction materials. At the same time, in order to sweeten the pill, the regime has lowered prices of other foods less popular with consumers. The increases, which reflect mounting material shortages, import constraints, and export requirements, are accentuating the impact of existing scarcities of meat, high-quality clothing, and housing. We do not expect, however, that the present price increases will encourage open manifestations of consumer dissatisfaction. Last year, the government sharply cut back supplies of household fuels and boosted prices of gasoline, public transport, and other consumer services 25 to 50 percent. [REDACTED]

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## SPECIAL ANALYSIS

## UGANDA: Ethnic Factors in the Post-Amin Period

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If President Amin's regime collapses as a result of current foreign and domestic pressures, a successor government would face--and be shaped by--the same ethnic and regional rivalries that have always played important roles in Ugandan politics. A major change in the ethnic and regional power balance has taken place under Amin and has aggravated existing animosities. In a post-Amin period this balance is likely to shift again and initiate a new period of instability. [REDACTED]

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Uganda has some 42 different ethnic groups, representing four linguistic families--Bantu (mainly in the south), Nilotic, Nilo-Hamitic, and Sudanic (all primarily in the north). Languages in the same family are structurally similar and more or less mutually intelligible; those in different families are not. [REDACTED]

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Uganda is divided between the Bantu speakers south of Lake Kyoga and the non-Bantu north of the lake. No single ethnic group is politically dominant, but the 20 or so Bantu groups, in the economic heartland, together account for about 65 percent of the population. Many northerners have migrated south to take advantage of better economic opportunities there, and some degree of ethnic mixing has occurred in the south. [REDACTED]

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The Bantu speakers are themselves divided. Linguistic and cultural differences and competition for political power have kept them from forming any effective long-term coalition. The lack of any sense of national identity and the strong traditional differences among the Bantu speakers have precluded effective organized opposition to any unpopular ruler--foreign or Ugandan. [REDACTED]

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The Baganda, who live along the shore of Lake Victoria, are the largest (about 16 percent of the total) and wealthiest group in Uganda. The central location of

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their area, known as Buganda, and its excellent soils and ample rainfall enable them to earn their living from agriculture and to grow sufficient quantities of coffee to make it the country's most important export crop. About 60 percent of the agricultural land in Buganda is devoted to cash crops, in contrast to about 30 percent for the country as a whole. [REDACTED]

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The Baganda traditionally had a highly centralized tribal political system but they have not been well represented in Uganda's military or police, probably because of the wide range of alternative economic opportunities open to them. [REDACTED]

#### Conflicts Under Obote

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Former President Milton Obote, a Lango from the north, was originally supported by an alliance of non-Baganda Protestants in the south but came increasingly to rely on northern support. Obote sought to establish a state in which the more populous and influential groups--especially the Baganda--could not dominate his northern supporters. [REDACTED]

At independence in 1962, Obote was named Prime Minister and the Kabaka (King) of the Baganda became President. Obote's pursuit of socialist policies conflicted with the capitalist tendencies of the southerners. In 1966, he seized control of the government, introduced a new constitution, and had himself proclaimed President by Parliament. The new constitution abolished the Kingdom of Baganda and the other southern kingdoms, and the Kabaka fled into exile. Later, Obote carried out a bloody purge of those who resisted the changes. [REDACTED]

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#### The Amin Era

In 1971, Amin--then Uganda's senior military officer--ousted Obote. A Sudanic-speaking Kakwa from one of the smallest ethnic groups, Amin is also a "Nubian"--a northerner who has converted to Islam and taken on the cultural practices of the southern Sudanese. Amin initially was popular with the southerners, if only because Obote was so intensely disliked. Amin soon lost popularity when the southerners realized that he was simply replacing Acholi-Lango with Kakwa-"Nubian" rule. In

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recent years, because of declining political support within the country, Amin has been forced to rely increasingly on minority peoples from the northwest to maintain his only power base--the military. [ ]

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"Nubians" were always well represented in the Army, but Amin increased the numbers and dominance of the "Nubians" in the military through selective recruitment and promotions. [ ]

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#### Leadership Prospects

Amin has destroyed or badly damaged most institutions capable of providing leadership; the badly shaken military is one of the few viable organizations remaining. [ ]

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The Army will probably play a critical role in the post-Amin era. If Amin alone is removed, and the "Nubian"-dominated military leadership is left intact, and if the ranks follow the leadership, changes could be minimal. If chaos follows Amin's ouster and large numbers of "Nubians" flee the country, chances are good that the remaining southern officers could assert themselves and possibly provide some measure of stability. In either case, the succession will have to be at least minimally acceptable to exile forces and the Tanzanians. A return to civilian rule is unlikely. [ ]

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Still another possibility is that leadership will be provided by an exile group or even by Obote reinstated as President, but that seems unlikely at this time. Amin has systematically decimated the Acholi and Lango leadership, although significant numbers of Acholis and Langos were in exile in Tanzania with Obote. The Baganda have also suffered politically and economically under Amin's rule, and their current leadership potential is unknown. [ ]

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The number, capabilities, and ethnic affiliation of exiles who may return when Amin is removed are the largest unknowns in the equation. Whatever government emerges, the longstanding north-south differences and the rivalries within each bloc that have been manifested throughout this century are not likely to cease. [ ]

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